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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCESS - Immunity of Service of Sum-
mons of Non-Resident While in the State to Testify in a Criminal
Action. - Defendant, a non-resident, in compliance with summons
mailed to him, returned to this State to appear as a witness in a
criminal action. Immediately after the hearing and on the same day
thereof, plaintiff sued out an attachment against him and against the
automobile in which he was traveling. The trial court granted a
motion to quash service of process on defendant and the service of
attachment on his automobile and dismissed the suit. On appeal,
-IELD: Affirmed. The defendant, a non-resident and while at-
tending a criminal trial in the Commonwealth of Virginia, was im-
mune from service of process and such immunity extended also to
the attachment of his automobile. Davis v. Hackney, 85 S.E. 2d
(Va. 1955).
From the very earliest times, the rule of law has prevailed that
a suitor or witness is exempt from service of process while without
the jurisdiction of his residence for the purpose of attending court
in an action to which he is a party, or in which he is to be sworn
as a witness. Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124, 23 Am. Rep. 35 (1876) ;
Cooper v. Wyntan, 122 N.C. 784, 29 S.E. 947 (1898); Durst v.
Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, 44 F. 2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394 (1930) ;
Dyar v. Georgia Power Co., 173 S.C. 527, 176 S.E. 711 (1932).
This rule of immunity is of such ancient origin that it is mentioned
in the Year Books of England as early as Henry VI. Sofge v. Lowe,
131 Tenn. 626, 176 S.W. 106 (1915); Harris Foundation v. Pot-
tawatomie County, 196 Okla. 222, 163 P. 2d 976 (1945). It came
to us out of the common law with only such modifications as were
required to make the principles underlying it harmonize with Ameri-
can institutions and accord with American jurisprudence. Brooks
v. State, 3 Boyce 1, 79 Atl. 790, 51 L.R.A. 1126 (Del. 1911) ; Sofge
v. Lowe, supra. The privilege or immunity is personal to the suitor
or witness, and is based on fundamental considerations of public
policy and the impartial and efficient administration of justice. In re
Healey, 53 Vt. 694, 38 Am. Rep. 713 (1881); Stewart v. Ramsay,
242 U.S. 192 (1916). To allow such service of summons would
discourage the voluntary appearance of those whose presence is ne-
cessary or convenient to the judicial administration in the pending
litigation. Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I. 304, 15 Atl. 83 (1888);
Lewis v. Miller, 115 Ky. 623, 74 S.W. 691 (1903) ; Lamb v. Schmitt,
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285 U.S. 222 (1932). This immunity works no injustice to anyone,
for unless the witness comes within the state there would be no op-
portunity to serve process upon him. Sherman v. Gundlach, 37
Minn. 118, 33 N.W. 549 (1887) ; Malloy v. Brewer, 7 S.D. 589, 64
N.W. 1120 (1895) ; Breon v. Miller Lumber Co., 83 S.C. 221, 65
S.E. 214, 24 L.R.A. 276 (1909). With the exception of non-resident
witnesses, the reason for the rule has, for the most part, passed
away. Civil arrests, in most states, no longer exist and any actual
interruption of the court by service of summons would be grounds
for contempt of court. Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S.W.
2d 127 (1933). In some jurisdictions the tendency has been to en-
large, rather than to diminish, the privilege of parties and witnesses
from service of process. Underwood v. Fosha, 73 Kan. 408, 85 Pac.
564 (1906); Barber v. Knowles, 77 Ohio 81, 82 N.E. 1065, 14
L.R.A. 663 (1907). In others, the tendency is to restrict the privi-
lege. Greenleaf v. People's Bank, 133 N.C. 292, 45 S.E. 638, 63
L.R.A. 499 (1903); Nelson v. McNulty, 135 Minn. 317, 160 N.W.
795 (1917). In any event, the privilege should not be enlarged be-
yond the reason upon which it is founded. Lamb v. Schmitt, supra;
Brooks v. State, supra. Having in mind that the privilege arises
out of the authority and dignity of the court and has for its primary
purpose the protection of the courts in its administration of justice,
and not the immunity of the person, it may in general be said that
it is to be accorded or withheld as judicial necessities require. Long
v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 222, 79 L. Ed. 208 (1934); Lamb v. Schmitt,
supra; Brooks v. State, supra.
It is well known that ambassadors and other public ministers serv-
ing in a foreign country are not subject to the laws of the country
in which they serve, and are exempt from the service of judicial
process in a civil action or proceeding. Also, there are, in most juris-
dictions, constitutional or statutory provisions which secure to cer-
tain other classes of persons, including non-resident witnesses in a
criminal action, a privilege or exemption from service of process in
a civil action against them. Such a privilege or exemption does not
necessarily rest upon the authority of a constitutional or statutory
provision but may be given by the courts upon grounds of public
policy, independently of legislative sanction. The majority of the
courts, including South Carolina, agree with the holding of the prin-
cipal case in that a non-resident witness is immune from service of
summons while without the jurisdiction of his residence for the pur-
pose of attending court as a witness.
J. N. MArPHRUS.
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MASTER AND SERVANT - Master's Duty to Furnish Servant
Safe Place to Work - Places Owned, Controlled, or Provided by
Third Persons. - Plaintiff was employed by defendants to haul and
place crushed stone on a stock pile which was located on the premises
of a third person. While operating one of defendant's trucks under
their direction and control, plaintiff was severely injured while un-
loading rock, when stock pile caved in and threw him against the
truck. Upon trial court's failure to sustain the defendant's demurrer,
and for a judgment based on such ruling, defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court. HELD: Reversed. Where an employee predi-
cates a right of recovery on the failure of his employer to exercise
due care to provide him a reasonably safe place to work, complaint
must show that employer either owned or had control of the premises
where injury occurred. Shires v. Sample, 238 N.C. 724, 79 S.E.
2d 193 (1953).
The general rule is that the master is under a non-delegable duty
to his servant to afford him a reasonably safe place in which to work.
Lester v. Carolina Clinchfield & Ohio Railway of South Carolina,
93 S.C. 395, 76 S.E. 976 (1912); McBrayer v. Virginia Carolina
Chemical Co., 95 S.C. 239, 78 S.E. 895 (1913). Even under the
general rule the master is not liable for harm resulting from dan-
gerous conditions of which he is not aware and which by a reason-
able inspection he would not have discovered. McGuire v. Bell Tele-
phone Co. of Buffalo, 167 N. Y. 208, 60 N.E. 433 (1901) ; Armour
v. Galkaiska, 202 Ill. 144, 66 N.E. 1037 (1903). An exception to
the general rule is that a master is not liable for injuries to his ser-
vant by reason of defects in places of work which are furnished
by or under the control of a third person. Wilson v. Valley Improve-
ment Co., 69 W. Va. 778, 73 S.E. 64 (1911) ; Crawford v. Michael
& Bivens Inc., 199 N.C. 224, 154 S.E. 58 (1930). This exception
is not generally recognized where the master contracts to do work on
the premises of another and retains direction and control of the work,
Vilter Manufacturing Co. v. Quirk, 199 F. 766 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1912) ; Albert Miller & Co. v. Wilkins, 209 F. 582 (C.C.W.D. Wis.
1913); and when the master used the premises regularly and per-
manently as distinguished from casual and incidental occupancy,
McGuire v. Bell Telephone Co., supra; Central of Georgia R. Co. v.
McClifford, 120 Ga. 90, 47 S.E. 90 (1904); or where there are
dangerous conditions created by third persons near the place of work,
Driggers v. Atlantic Coast Liner Co., 151 S.C. 164, 148 S.E. 889
(1928) ; Clark v. Union Iron & Foundry Co., 234 Mo. 436, 137 S.W.
577 (1911) ; or where the duty to keep reasonably safe the means of
[Vol. 8
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ingress and egress from the place where the work is done is an inci-
dent of the duty of the master to provide a safe place to work, Powers
v. Standard Oil Co., 53 S.C. 358, 31 S.E. 276 (1897); E. B. Hunt-
ing and Co. v. Quarterman, 120 Ga. 344, 47 S.E. 928 (1904); nor
where the master has actual knowledge of a specific defect which he
does not communicate to the servant. Dunlap v. Richmond & D. R.
Co., 81 Ga. 136, 7 S.E. 283 (1888) ; Hume v. Ft. Halifax Power Co.,
106 Me. 78, 75 At. 300 (1909). To impose a duty on a master to
provide a safe place to work on premises over which he has no con-
trol, or which he had never seen, and the condition of which he neither
knew nor could know, might be to impute to the master the negli-
gence of a third person. Seminole Graphite Co. v. Thomas, 205 Ala.
22, 87 So. 366 (1920) ; Gillespie Ex'rs v. Howard, 219 Ky. 721, 294
S.W. 154 (1927). Generally the master is not liable where he neither
has, nor assumes, possession, use, or control of the premises where
the servant may be at work. Channon v. Sanford Co., 70 Conn. 573,
40 Atl. 462 (1898); Lidgren v. William. Bros. Boiler Mfg. Co., 112
Minn. 186, 127 N.W. 626 (1910).
The master's liability for failure to furnish a safe place of work
arises from a breach of a non-delegable duty owed to the servant.
The necessity for an exception to the general rule, when the em-
ployee is on the premises owned or controlled by a third party, is
questioned. As betveen a servant and his employer all premises
which he is authorized or directed to use ought, in fairness, to be
placed upon the same footing as those which actually belong to the
employer. There is no ground for contending that his want of con-
trol over the premises constitutes a serious obstacle to his obtaining
sufficient knowledge of its condition; therefore, there would be no
hardship or injustice in requiring him to make such investigation as
may be necessary for that purpose. The mere fact that the employer
has no control over the premises and thus is unable to remedy de-
fective conditions, should not absolve him from liability as he could,
and certainly should, refrain from giving his servants orders which
would put them in a position where their safety would be imperiled
by such conditions.
ROBeRT L. HAWTHORNM, JR.
INSURANCE - Insurer's Acceptance and Retention of Premiums
as Evidence of Intention to Continue Policy in Force. - This is an
action by an insured against her insurer to determine whether or
not a policy had been renewed and was in effect at the time of an
1955]
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accident. The defendant advised that all questions as to the policy
should be called to the attention of the local representative. Prior to
the expiration of the policy, plaintiff received a notice of a required
premium due to renew the policy. She then made inquiry to the
local representative who assured her of a 30 day grace period al-
though the policy gave no reference to such. Twenty-eight days
after the policy had expired payment was mailed. Later the same
day, the truck covered by the policy was demolished. Eighteen days
later, after the defendant had knowledge of the accident, he notified
plaintiff that the payment had arrived too late to prevent cancella-
tion of the old policy since the period of grace was only 17 days, but
that the payment had been applied to a new policy. Plaintiff replied
stating that she refused to accept a new policy and had no further
need of one, and that she considered the old policy still in effect. No
tender or return of premiums was ever made. judgment was ren-
dered for the plaintiff. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed on either of
two grounds: (1) The apparent authority of the agent was suffici-
ent to bind the principal; or (2) The defendant, by receiving the
premium notice of the plaintiff with his payment, and being explicit-
ly advised that no new contract was desired or accepted, was obligated
either to return the premium, or to be held to have waived its ground
for avoidance or forfeiture of the original policy. Farm Bureau
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Bobo, 214 F. 2d 575 (4th Cir. 1954).
An insurance company may waive, or be estopped to assert, a
ground for avoidance or forfeiture of any insurance policy and the
courts are prompt to seize on any circumstances which indicate a
waiver on the part of the company or which will raise an estoppel
against it. 45 C. J. S. Insurance § 672. Where a contract of acci-
dent insurance expires from time to time subject to renewal at the
option of both parties, the failure to pay an additional premium
essential to renewal of the policy causes a lapse of the policy. Jackson
v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 254, 56 P. 2d 1264 (1936) ;
Taylor v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n., 133 F. 2d
279 (8th Cir. 1943). A conflict exists among the authorities as to
whether the renewal of an insurance policy constitutes a new con-
tract or is merely a continuance of the old contract. Annot., 77
A.L.R. 357. Cases taking the view that a new contract is created
are: Equitable L. v. McElroy, 83 F. 631 (8th Cir. 1897) ; Wastun
v. Lincoln Nat. L. Ins. Co., 12 F. 2d 422 (8th Cir. 1926). Cases
supporting the view that the old contract is continued, with which
South Carolina is in accord, are: Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy,
203 Ala. 452, 83 So. 591 (1919); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Buch-
[Vol. 8
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berg, 249 Mich. 317, 228 N.W. 770, 67 A.L.R. 1483 (1930);
Murray v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 193 S.C. 368, 8 S.E. 2d 314
(1939). If the date at which the reinstated policy is to begin is
uncertain, it must be construed as to protect the policyholder. Mac-
Donald v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 304 Pa. 231, 155 Atl. 491, 77
A.L.R. 353 (1931). The acceptance of a premium or assessment,
liability for which exists only on the assumption that the policy is
to continue in force, is an election not to terminate it because of a
known breach of condition. Doyle v. Hill, 75 S.C. 261, 55 S.E. 446
(1906) ; WiLLisToN, CONTRAcTS, P. 568 (Revised 1938). Retention
of unearned premiums by an insurer with knowledge of facts suffici-
ent to work a forfeiture of its policy is a waiver of the condition
and the insurer is estopped from claiming a forfeiture. Gandy v.
Orient Ins. Co., 52 S.C. 224, 29 S.E. 655 (1897); American Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Castham, 185 F. 2d 729 (1950). Acceptance of
the payment of a premium note after maturity also operates as a
waiver of the forfeiture. Hodson v. Guardian L. Ins. Co., 97 Mass.
144, 93 Am. Dec. 73 (1867); Duncan v. Missouri St. L. Ins. Co.,
160 F. 646 (8th Cir. 1908). When an insurer learns of facts suffici-
ent to establish a forfeiture, he must either cancel the policy or forego
further collections of premiums, and a failure to do either will oper-
ate as a waiver. Hicks v. Home Security L. Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 614,
39 S.E. 2d 914 (1946). He may not treat the policy as avoided for
purposes of defense in an action to recover on the policy and at the
same time treat it as valid for the purpose of earning and receiving
premiums. Guaranty L. Ins. Co. v. Pughaley, 57 Ga. App. 588, 196
S.E. 265 (1938). Acceptance and retention of premiums manifestly
indicate waiver of forfeiture. Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E. 2d 8 (1951). By accepting overdue
premiums an insurance company may waive its rights to enforce a
forfeiture of the policy. Duncan v. Missouri St. L. Ins. Co., 160
F. 646 (8th Cir. 1908) ; Jordan v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S.,
170 S.C. 19, 169 S.E. 673 (1933). In addition to giving notice
as provided by the policy, the company must return or tender the
unearned premiums in order to effect a cancellation. Nitch v. Am.
Century Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 635, 46 N.E. 1149 (1897); Tisdell v.
N. H. Fire Ins. Co., 155 N.Y. 163, 49 N.E. 664, 40 L.R.A. 765
(1898).
When an insurance policy has expired and caused a lapse, there
is a split of authority as to whether the renewal of a policy creates a
new contract which must be accepted by the insurance company, or
whether the old contract is continued in effect upon the payment
1955]
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of the premiums. The latter view is the one expressed by the South
Carolina courts and must be followed in this case. Since an insur-
ance company, by accepting a premium on the assumption that the
policy is to continue in force, or retaining unearned premiums, or
accepting payment of a premium note after maturity or overdue
premiums, is estopped from claiming a forfeiture of the policy, and
must forego further collections of premiums and tender unearned
portions thereof in order to effect a cancellation, we must conclude
that the defendant has, by accepting and retaining the overdue
premiums, waived its rights to enforce a forfeiture of the policy. On
first appearance it may seem that this rule alone would not extend
to the present case without the support of the first finding of the
court as to the power of the agent to bind the principal, since the
defendant had not received the premium at the time of the accident,
and the policy gave no mention of a grace period. Also, there might
have been grounds for the insurer applying the premiums to a new
policy as alleged. However, the law of South Carolina is that the
old policy is in effect upon the payment of the overdue premium and
the insurance acceptance and retention of them is, as a matter of
law, evidence of his intention to continue the policy in force.
PAUL ROGERS.
ATTORNEYS- Unauthorized Practice of Law by Corporations
-What Acts Amount to Such Unauthorized Practice.-This was
an action to enjoin defendant corporation from engaging in the al-
leged unauthorized practice of law. The lower court refused to
enjoin defendant from probating estates, through its employees who
were licensed attorneys, in which defendant was named executor, and
its appearance in court in the administration of estates or trusts in
which it was named executor, administrator, guardian, or other fi-
duciary. This included preparation of notices, inventories, accounts,
motions, precedents for orders, and all other pleading and instru-
ments which were necessary or admissible in the administration of
such estates or trusts. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. The defendant has the right to use its books and
facilities to compile data necessary to the drafting of inventories and
accounts only and to actually prepare and draft the same. It is the
presentation of such instruments in court and the invocation of the
court's processes thereon and not the preparation thereof that con-
stitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Arkansas Bar Association
[Vol. 8
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et al. v. Union National Bank of Little Rock, 273 S.W. 2d 408 (Ark.
1954).
At common law and generally by statute an individual may appear
as counsel in his own behalf and perform acts which, if done for
others, would constitute the practice of law. Americus v. McGinnis,
128 Wash. 28, 221 Pac. 987 (1937) ; Stewart v. Hall, 198 Ark. 403,
129 S.W. 2d 238 (1939); Jefferson v. British American Oil Pro-
ducing Company, 193 Okla. 599, 145 P. 2d 387 (1944). The purpose
of prohibiting laymen from practicing law is not for the purpose of
creating a monopoly in the legal profession, nor for its protection,
but to assure the public adequate protection in the pursuit of justice
by preventing the intrusion of incompetent and unlearned persons
in the practice of law. State ex rel. Daniel v. Wills, 191 S.C. 468, 5
S.E. 2d 181 (1939). When an individual appears in court to repre-
sent himself he must comply with the established rules of procedure.
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass-n. v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.
2d 693 (1948); Briggs v. Spader, 411 Ill. 42, 103 N.E. 2d 104
(1951). And where such representation has disrupted the function-
ing of the courts, impeding judicial progress, the case would be sub-
ject to dismissal. Jefferson v. British American Oil Producing Com-
pany, supra; Shotkin v. Kaplan, 116 Colo. 295, 180 P. 2d 1021
(1947).
In many of the jurisdictions the trend has been to regulate the
practice of law by corporations by enacting statutes. Corporate Fi-
duciaries and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 18 VA. L. Riv. 444
(1939). The determining factor as to what is the practice of
law is the character of service rendered and not the type of tribunal
before whom such services are rendered. People ex rel. State Bar
Ass'n. v. People's Stock Yard State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901
(1931); State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E. 2d 181
(1939). There are many opinions as to what services constitute the
practice of law. At least one court has held that where a corpora-
tion is authorized to carry on a fiduciary business, such as executor,
administrator, trustee, agent, custodian or manager, it is not engaged
in the practice of law in probating wills or in giving advice on the
management of estates and related problems, where services per-
formed are reasonably incidental to the conduct of its authorized busi-
ness. Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F. 2d 271, 71
App. D.C. 72 (1940). The Georgia Court takes the position that
the statute regulating the practice of law has reference to the prac-
tice before the courts only and a lawfully organized corporation may
-examine, certify and guarantee titles of real estate requested by a
1955]
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customer. Atlanta Title & T. Co. v. Boykin, 172 Ga. 437, 157 S.E.
455 (1931). But the majority of courts hold that the practice of
law is not limited to appearing before the courts but includes draft-
ing of documents to be presented to the courts. In re Show Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n., 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E. 2d 746 (1936); Detroit
Bar Association v. Union Guardian. Trust Co., 282 Mich. 237, 267
N.W. 372 (1938). In examining the services performed by the
corporation in determining whether the corporation is unlawfully
practicing law, the courts are particularly interested as to whether
or not the corporation is holding itself out for the practice of the law.
Atlanta Title & T. Co., supra; Creditors National Clearing House v.
Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, 116 N.E. 886 (1917). It is to be no-
ticed that most of the corporations have attempted to hide their prac-
tice of law by employing licensed attorneys. Re Co-operative Law-
Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910) ; Re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254,
232 N.W. 318 (1930). And it is generally accepted that it cannot
practice law directly or indirectly. Judd v. City Trust & Saving
Bank, 133 Ohio 81, 12 N.E. 2d 288 (1938) ; Montgomery v. Utilities
Ins. Co., 134 Tex. 640, 138 S.W. 2d 162 (1938).
The reasoning behind regulating the practice of law is that it is
not a business open to all, but a personal right limited to those who'
can qualify. Re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15
(1910) ; People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 19 Cal. 531, 209 Pac.
363 (1922). If the corporation were allowed to engage lawyers to
practice of the public the close relationship of trust and confidence
between the client and his attorney would be at an end. People v.
Merchants Protective Corp., supra; United States Title Guaranty
Co. v. Brown, 217 N.Y. 628, 111 N.E. 828 (1916). The attorney
would look to the client and the corporation with divided loyalty; the
public would suffer and the bar would be degraded. Re Co-operative
Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910) ; People v. People's Trust
Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1917). A corpora-
tion can employ an attorney to conduct its own legal affairs, but the
conducting of fiduciary relations by a corporation through an attor-
ney employed by it is the illegal practice of law. Swift v. Board of
County Commissioners, 76 Minn. 194, 78 N.W. 1107 (1899) ; Stew-
art Abstract Co. v. Judicial Commission of Jefferson County, Tex.
Civ. App., 131 S.W. 2d 686 (1939).
The purpose of regulating the practice of law is for the benefit of
the individual. Controlling the practice of law is necessary to pre-
serve the close relationship between the client and attorney which is
necessary for justice and good practice, and as the basis for the all-
[Vol. a
9
et al.: RECENT CASES
Published by Scholar Commons,
1955] RZcZNT CASES 263
important regulation of the profession. The corporation should be
limited to the practice of law insofar as their own business is con-
cerned. Beyond this point in cases where the business of the cor-
poration is that of representing the customer in a fiduciary capacity,
there should be strict enforcement of any regulations governing the
practice of law. The responsibility of enforcement would fall on
members of the legal profession, and prosecution should be through
the bar association of the particular jurisdiction. There is no doubt
that the drawing and the handling of legal papers is as much a part
of the practice of the law as representing a client in the courts. It
requires a qualified legal mind, and one that is not separated from
the client by divided loyalty. The public deserves this protection
from those who can most effectively give it.
G. H. K xs.
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